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Abstract 
 
The recent negotiations on climate change in Paris have left partly open the discussion on a long-term 
global goal, in the form of an upper limit to warming. Agreement on such a limit is a political decision 
that need to be informed by scientific knowledge through a mapping that systematically explores the 
consequences of different policy choices. Such a multi-disciplinary effort, based on the analysis of a 
set of scenarios, helped structure the IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report. This Perspective summarizes this 
approach and its results, reviews its strengths and limitations, and discusses how decision-makers can 
use these results in practice. It also identifies research needs to facilitate integrated analysis of the 
climate change problem and to help better inform policy-makers and the public. 
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A key component of international negotiations on climate change has been the agreement on a long-
term global goal, in the form of an upper limit to warming, to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system” (Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change). The Paris Agreement now quantifies for the first time this goal as the objective to hold “the 
increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue 
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would 
significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.”  
 
The choice of this objective is the result of a long and complex political process that has been informed 
by the science of climate change, notably as summarized by the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) Synthesis 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), published in November 2014. 
Similarly, the eventual decision on making the additional effort needed to hold the temperature 
increase below 1.5°C will be informed by existing and future IPCC assessments. The mandate of the IPCC 
is to inform decision-making at all levels, including the international negotiations, and the IPCC has 
responded positively to the invitation by the UNFCCC to “provide a special report in 2018 on the impacts 
of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission 
pathways.”  
 
As the IPCC engages with the scientific community in scoping its report, it is essential to reaffirm that 
scientific analysis cannot, by itself, identify a single best long-term goal. One major reason is that 
individuals and groups have distinct values and priorities. Because climate and climate policy have a 
wide range of impacts that differ across countries, communities and individuals, a temperature target 
also depends on preferences regarding equity and fairness. The need to aggregate the wide variety of 
impacts also involves value judgments, for example the relative importance ascribed to economic 
damages versus impacts that are harder to monetize, such as biodiversity loss. Another example is that 
the long-term goal depends on relative valuation of present versus future outcomes. As long as values 
and preferences vary widely, purely scientific methods cannot specify a unique and consensual upper 
limit for warming. A long-term goal for climate policy can be agreed upon only through a political 
process, both national and international 1.  
 
Science can inform such a process, however, through a mapping that systematically explores the 
consequences of different policy choices for climate change and the risks it creates 2. Such a multi-
disciplinary effort, based on the analysis of a set of scenarios, helped structure the IPCC AR5 Synthesis 
Report (IPCC, 2014a). Here, we summarize this approach and – going beyond the AR5 – we review its 
strengths and limitations and discuss how decision-makers can use these results in practice, notably to 
think about future choices regarding the long-term objective of climate action. We also identify research 
needs to facilitate integrated analysis of the climate change problem and to help better inform policy-
makers and the public.    
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Figure 1: The mapping of the relationship between risks from climate change, temperature change, 
cumulative CO2 emissions, and annual GHG emissions changes by 2050 and 2100. Limiting the additional 
risks due to climate change across five ‘Reasons For Concern’ (five shaded bars, panel a) implies a limit 
for future cumulative emissions of CO2 (panel b), which constrains annual emissions over the next few 
decades and until the end of the 21st century (panel c). See text for more information. (Figure based on 
IPCC, 2014a, with additional information.) 
THE FIGURE: LINKING RISKS AND EMISSIONS 
Figure 1 links long-term climate change risks to their implications for annual emission levels under a 
broad range of scenarios. In the top left panel of Figure 1, five “Reasons For Concern” summarize how 
additional risks for societies and ecosystems change with increasing global mean temperature, 
compared with pre-industrial levels, as assessed in the Working Group II (WGII) contribution to the IPCC 
AR5 3. Each Reason for Concern is anchored in different values and priorities, reflecting differences in 
the relative importance ascribed to the present versus the future, aggregate outcomes versus 
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inequalities across individuals, most-likely versus possible extreme scenarios, and different categories of 
impacts. The Reasons for Concern are associated with (1) unique and threatened systems, such as coral-
reef ecosystems and the societies dependent on them; (2) extreme weather events, such as heat waves 
and coastal flooding; (3) the uneven distribution of impacts, especially for poor communities and most-
affected ecosystems; (4) global aggregate impacts, for example for Earth’s biodiversity and the global 
economy; and (5) large-scale singular events, including, for example, ecosystem and ice-sheet tipping 
points. For each, the color indicates the additional risk due to climate change when a temperature level 
is reached and then sustained or exceeded, reflecting the judgments of AR5 authors based on the 
assessed literature. 
The top right panel describes the relationship between cumulative CO2 emissions and temperature 
change, from IPCC Working Group I (WGI) contribution to AR5 4. While warming also depends on 
concentrations of non-CO2 greenhouse gases (such as methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, 
perfluorinated compounds, and sulphur hexafluoride) as well as short-lived air pollutants like soot and 
tropospheric ozone, the warming associated with CO2 emissions persists for many centuries, a result of 
the long-term persistence of some of the CO2 released to the atmosphere and the coupled dynamics of 
ocean-heat and CO2 uptake. The black solid line shows the consistent linear relationship between 
cumulative CO2 emissions since 1870 and CO2-induced warming. Comparing this to the grey solid line, 
representing the median relationship between total global mean temperature change and cumulative 
CO2 emissions, shows that net non-CO2 warming is expected to increase, from near zero at present to 
over 0.5oC if cumulative CO2 emissions reach 4,000 GtCO2 under the scenarios considered.  
The shaded plume is based on comprehensive climate models assessed in the WGI. It shows the 
uncertainty from the climate system response (multi-model 90% range), but because it is based on four 
emission scenarios only (the four Representative Concentration Pathways or RCPs), it gives a limited 
sampling of the uncertainty arising from the balance between CO2 and non-CO2 emissions and the 
possible pathways of emissions through time.  
The ellipses show only the median climate response from a simple climate model, but they provide a 
more exhaustive assessment of the uncertainty arising from roughly 1200 different emission pathways, 
assessed in the Working Group III (WGIII) contribution to the IPCC AR5 5. The ellipses include baseline 
scenarios and mitigation scenarios, with differences in the mixture of gases and their timing of release. 
Baseline scenarios assume no new climate policy, while mitigation scenarios assume that additional 
policies are introduced beyond those in place today to reduce emissions.  
Each ellipse corresponds to a specific category of scenarios defined by their climate forcing in 2100, 
expressed in terms of the CO2 equivalent concentrations in ppm CO2-eq, and is labelled accordingly. The 
shape of the ellipses is derived from the distribution of data points available per category. In particular, 
the principle axes of the ellipses correspond to the principle axes of the underlying point cloud. The 
ellipses are scaled based on the assessed ranges of CO2 cumulative emissions, temperature projection, 
or GHG emissions reductions in a particular year, respectively, as assessed for each category by IPCC 
Working Group III in the Table SPM.1 (in each case the 10-90th percentile is shown). 
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Any level of cumulative CO2 emissions can be linked to warming only with a certain confidence level. 
The grey lines show the maximum cumulative emissions associated with limiting warming to any 
temperature level with probabilities of 50% (median response), 67% and 84%, respectively, based on the 
comprehensive climate models under the four RCPs. To keep warming below 2oC, the probabilistic 
constraints imply an emission caps of 2670 GtCO2 (84%), 2800 GtCO2 (67%), and 3140 GtCO2 (50%). 
These probabilities of reaching the temperature target are useful benchmarks, but are very low 
compared with the probability of success usually applied in risk management, for instance in flood 
control or safety norms in industries.   
The bottom right panel of Figure 1 links the cumulative CO2 emissions from 1870 to 2100 to changes in 
annual GHG emissions in 2050 and 2100, relative to 2010. This link is based on scenarios from integrated 
assessment models. Models mostly generate a cost-effective distribution of effort across time, sectors, 
and countries, but an increasing number of scenarios also explore the implications of deviations from  
the least-cost pathways, including delays in additional mitigation (until 2030), different assumptions 
regarding technology costs and availability, or alternative distributions of mitigation effort. Each ellipse 
shows, for one scenario category, the range of changes in annual GHG emissions (vertical axis) in 2050 
and 2100 consistent with a range of cumulative CO2 emissions until 2100 (horizontal axis). The 2670-
2800 GtCO2 budget range consistent with limiting warming to 2oC with 67-84% probability is most 
closely aligned with the light-blue “430-480” scenario category, which corresponds to reductions in GHG 
emissions by 40–70% in 2050, relative to 2010. For limiting warming to any levels below about 2.5°C, net 
GHG emissions in 2100 need to be negative or near zero (dashed-line ellipses).   
The figure can also be read from bottom right to top left to understand how policy choices about near-
term emissions result in different climate change risks over the long-term, if consistent pathways are 
followed and efforts are not relaxed over time. This use of the figure works well with the “bottom-up 
approach” of the Paris Agreement, where countries commit to nationally-determined contributions that 
are not determined based on an agreed global goal. It facilitates translation of emissions pathways (up 
to 2050) that are likely to result from a set of country commitments into the change in global 
temperature and resulting risks.  
The figures indicates that scenarios without increased mitigation ambition lead to very high cumulative 
emissions in 2100 (around 6500–8000 GtCO2 from 1870, baseline ellipse in bottom right panel), 
corresponding to warming between 3.8 and 5oC (top-right panel, 90% range). This corresponds to high 
to very-high risk levels across the reasons for concern. Policies implemented now to achieve a 50% GHG 
emissions reduction by 2050 would be consistent with cumulative CO2 emissions of 2500–3200 GtCO2 
from 1870, corresponding to warming of 0.8-2.7oC. The resulting risks range from undetectable (for the 
lower temperature range and some reasons for concern) to high and very high (for the higher range and 
some reasons for concern), highlighting the large uncertainty in the full causal chain from policies to 
risks of impacts and the need for a risk-based understanding of the climate problem. These results 
should be used with caution, as there is no guarantee that the literature provides a statistically 
representative or exhaustive sample, and it is not possible to interpret these ranges in statistical terms. 
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Figure 1 supports and provides quantification for two important conclusions of the AR5. First, without 
additional policies, “warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high-to-very-high risk of severe, 
widespread, and irreversible impacts globally.” Second, “for any upper limit on warming, the world will 
eventually need to achieve zero net emissions of CO2 at the global scale, and CO2 and GHG emissions 
need to be close or below zero by the end of this century to maintain temperature below 2oC compared 
to pre-industrial levels.” The figure can also inform decision-makers on the consequences of different 
choices regarding the long-term climate target and on the emissions reductions that are needed 
between now and 2050 and beyond to keep warming or climate change risks below certain levels. 
Specifically, it shows that reaching a “balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century” – one of the stated objective of 
the Paris Agreement -does not guarantee stabilizing temperature below 2oC: a number of scenarios 
achieve near-zero emissions by 2100, yet still lead to warming around 2.5°C (even with the median 
climate response). Further, capping global mean temperature is not sufficient to stabilize many other 
impacts, most notable the long-term impact of sea level rise and ice sheet melting 6. 
The figure – and the information on which it is based – was designed to map the climate change 
challenge in an integrated way, considering warming levels of up to 6°C. Because only few socio-
economic, policy, and climate scenarios were available for IPCC assessment that are consistent with a 
1.5°C objective, the current mapping does not provide enough information on the difference in risks and 
needed action to compare 1.5°C and 2°C targets. Recently, scenarios consistent with a 1.5°C limit have 
been published 7. One important theme for future work is producing more scenarios from several 
research teams with temperature targets around the 1.5-2°C range, and to explore the risks and 
opportunities that they entail. One output of this work could be a “zoomed” version of the figure, 
specifically designed to inform the current debate on the long-term temperature goal.  
THE ORIGIN – NOT ONLY THE MAGNITUDE – OF UNCERTAINTY MATTERS FOR DECISION-MAKING 
In spanning different domains of the climate change issue, from the driver of climate change to the 
Earth system response and climate policies, the mapping we present here necessarily aggregates diverse 
uncertainties. The overall uncertainty combines limitations in our knowledge of the climate system 
response – for instance uncertainty in the relationship between radiative forcing and temperature 
change – with uncertainties intertwined with human choices – for instance efforts to reduce emissions 
of CO2 versus non-CO2 gases. Aggregation and simplification, based on expert judgment, are inherent to 
assessment. At the same time, the different drivers of uncertainty have implications for decision-making 
that are important to explore.  
Some of the uncertainty invokes considerations of precaution. For example, even if emissions remain 
within a CO2 budget that has a 67% chance of keeping warming below 2°C, there is a 33% probability 
that warming can be greater. Similarly, scenarios make assumptions on how technologies will evolve in 
the future. If the technological future turns out to be much less favorable than assumed in these 
scenarios, a goal decided in 2015 may prove infeasible by 2050. It is not possible to quantify all these 
sources of uncertainty in a unique and objective way. In particular, the range of emission reductions in 
2050 for different risk or temperature targets is based on the scenarios described in the literature, but 
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cannot be associated with probabilities that could serve as an input for a probabilistic cost-benefit 
analysis or an (expected) cost-minimization approach.  
These aspects highlight the deep uncertainty that surrounds the relationship between a long-term 
climate goal and the corresponding short-term policies 8–10. From a risk management perspective, this 
uncertainty also implies the need to think about possible responses to worst-case scenarios and to 
monitor climate change and its impacts to detect as soon as possible departures from most-likely 
scenarios.  
This is particularly crucial in the context of the 1.5 and 2°C targets. In this context, it is important to keep 
in mind that the short-term policies judged today to be consistent with these targets could actually lead 
to much higher warming levels. This may happen, for instance, because a technology that is expected to 
play a key role after 2050 finally proves unavailable at the required scale. In particular, if negative 
emissions are not practical at the scale required, then an agreed long-term climate goals may prove 
unattainable 11,12. The uncertainty is especially linked to the unknown capability of bioenergy with 
carbon capture and sequestration and other carbon dioxide removal technologies to deliver large 
negative emissions 13,14. A similar situation may arise if the warming in response to greenhouse gases is 
at the high end of the uncertainty range, making the scenarios that are currently considered consistent 
with 1.5 or 2°C reach higher warming. Comparing a 1.5 and a 2°C target is therefore not about 
comparing impacts in a 1.5 and a 2°C world: it is about comparing risks, including the risks of finally 
ending up at a much higher warming 15. And indeed, to compare the costs and benefits of selecting the 
long-term target, one has to take into account that one of the main benefit of a 1.5°C long term target 
over a 2°C target is that it reduces the likelihood of a much higher warming, and limits the climate risks 
posed by key technologies not delivering in the future.   
In contrast, some aspects of uncertainty can be viewed as opportunities to learn and adjust responses. 
Learning over time opens opportunities to adjust climate policies flexibly based on new information and 
knowledge. The mapping exercise suggests a large scientific uncertainty in the link between a given level 
of emissions in 2050 and the expected temperature change. This uncertainty is due in part to the 
existence of multiple pathways to achieve any climate goal: it is possible to compensate modest short-
term mitigation efforts if larger efforts are made later in the century, and, conversely, the climate 
benefits of early mitigation efforts can be undone if mitigation efforts are relaxed after 2050.  
At the same time, the range of targets that can be achieved at a given cost, with a given level of 
mitigation risks, and with a given probability of success will be increasingly narrowed over time if 
emissions are only moderately reduced in the near term  16–19. The window of options is rapidly closing 
20–22.  While there are multiple possible pathways to achieve a temperature objective, rapidly growing 
risks and economic, social, and political costs – which are not represented in the figure – create an 
urgency 11.  
Aggregating these uncertainties may give decision-makers the impression that we know less than we 
actually do and insufficiently communicate the degrees of freedom that exist in the design of global 
climate policies. A priority for future research is to go beyond the assessment of uncertainty and 
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investigate the source of these uncertainties and how they affect decision-making, and to develop new 
and better tools to communicate this information in a way that is actionable. 
A LONG-TERM CLIMATE GOAL IMPLIES A LIMIT ON CUMULATIVE CO2 EMISSIONS, BUT THE TIMING OF 
ACTION AND NON-CO2 GASES STILL MATTERS 
The central link in Figure 1 is a budget expressed in cumulative CO2 emissions (IPCC, 2013). The 
cumulative emissions approach emphasizes the important conclusion that, for any upper limit on 
warming, the world will eventually need to achieve zero net emissions at the global scale. But what are 
the limits of such an approach? A multitude of emission pathways are able to reach a given target. These 
pathways differ in terms of distribution of efforts over time and of allocation of efforts between CO2 and 
non-CO2 gases and aerosols.  
Climate stabilization implies a limited cumulative CO2 budget. The top-right panel of Figure 1 includes an 
idealized scenario noted “CO2-induced warming,” the median warming in the models with CO2 as the 
only GHG. This scenario provides a benchmark for the relative contribution of CO2 and non-CO2 gases. 
All scenarios envisage non-CO2-induced warming to increase in the future, but in the large majority of 
scenarios, there is a strong correlation between the emissions of CO2 and non-CO2 gases. This 
correlation is in part due to the fact that cost-effective scenarios assume a uniform level of effort across 
all GHGs (for instance through an economy-wide carbon price), but it also arises from the fact that CO2 
and non-CO2 gases are partly released from common sources and therefore linked 23,24. The correlation 
between CO2 and non-CO2 gases will thus not disappear in scenarios with fragmented (sector-scale) 
policies, even though it will be weaker. A carbon budget is a simplification, but it is a useful 
simplification for the communication of the climate change challenge and policy options. 
Still, different pathways of emissions with the same cumulative CO2 budgets may lead to different rates 
of climate change, even if the long-term warming is unchanged. Over the next few decades, substantial 
reductions in both CO2 emissions and emissions of non-CO2 short-lived climate pollutants like methane, 
soot and tropospheric ozone precursors can slow the expected rate of climate change even though the 
impact of near-term emissions of short-lived pollutants on long-term temperature is limited 23. Lower 
rates of climate change, in turn, can reduce risks for ecosystems and societies, reduce the risk of 
crossing tipping points 25,26, and increase the potential for adaptation 3. Further, the assumption that net 
negative emissions will be achievable later in the century leads to mitigation scenarios that temporarily 
exceed the compatible CO2 budget. This leads to a temperature overshoot, which in turn has 
implications for societies and ecosystems. The rate of warming is included in the assessment of some of 
the Reasons for Concern, but the assessment here does not include a limit on acceptable rate of change.  
More generally, accounting for peak warming (instead of the stabilization level or end-of-the-century 
warming) and additional metrics of climate change, such as the rate of change, local impacts, or ocean 
acidification impacts, could change the assessment of various long-term climate goals and short-term 
mitigation policies 27. While Figure 1 provides a useful summary of climate risks, it cannot encompass 
the full complexity of the climate problem, and decision-makers have to go beyond stabilized global 
temperature as they consider the consequences of various emission pathways. These additional metrics 
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and local and dynamic aspects also create a wedge between the Article 2 objective – avoiding dangerous 
climate change – and the current debate on a long-term goal expressed as a long-term limit on warming. 
This is particularly important for the assessment of climate change mitigation options, such as 
geoengineering, that may maintain the global temperature below a certain level, but with important and 
unintended side-effects that emerge only under alternative metrics. A world with a 1.5°C warming 
reached through reduced GHG emissions implies very different risks than a world with the same level of 
warming reached through geoengineering options like solar radiation management.  
Finally, decision-makers have to account for the consequences of short-term decisions, which create 
long-term commitments.  Specifically, emission reductions at the low end of the 2050 range consistent 
with the 2oC target (e.g., around 40%) create a commitment to climate policies with more rapid 
reductions – and larger negative emissions – beyond 2050. Defining the level of near-term action that is 
sufficient to achieve a given target depends on what is deemed realistic over the long-term 16. Defining 
what is possible or realistic is not straightforward, as it depends less on technical or economic feasibility 
than on political and social acceptability 20. As a result, defining a near-term emission gap (or a climate 
action gap) for any long-term objective remains challenging and partly subjective. 
A MORE CONSISTENT AND COMPREHENSIVE VISION OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS, INCLUDING FROM 
MITIGATION, IS NEEDED 
The mitigation scenarios underpinning Figure 1 all fundamentally depart from continued high emissions. 
They involve the global transformation of energy and land-use systems, whether they hold warming 
below 1.5°C, 2°C or 3°C by 2100. There are costs and risks associated with the required mitigation 
policies and measures. In addition, mitigation policies can generate immediate co-benefits, for example, 
better air quality and health benefits or more comfortable buildings that are also less costly to heat or 
air condition 28. While a 1.5°C target may look unambiguously safer than a 2°C target when focusing on 
climate change risks, the picture may become more complex if mitigation risks are accounted. Ideally, a 
mapping exercise should enable comparison of the risks of climate change impacts (in the top-left panel) 
with the costs and co-benefits associated with emissions changes (depicted in the bottom-right panel).  
This limitation has consequences on how the figure can and should be used. While the figure shows 
many different pathways compatible with a given temperature target, the “feasibility” of these 
pathways also depends on the economic cost and social and political acceptability of the corresponding 
policies and measures 20. The flexibility – and option to delay mitigation action – that the figure may 
suggest does not fully include these economic, social, and political constraints. Introducing these factors 
– arguably a difficult challenge – would lead to removal of some of the pathways shown in the figure 
and reduce the flexibility in the choice among pathways.  
What are options to include these additional factors? Efforts that attempt to define an “optimal” long-
term climate goal have often focused on estimates of macroeconomic costs, comparing costs of climate 
change impacts and mitigation costs. Aggregate costs of climate change impacts, however, are only one 
component of one of the five Reasons for Concerns and cannot adequately encompass all dimensions of 
impacts. Similarly, mitigation costs, benefits, and risks cannot be adequately summarized in a single 
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number in an objective way, because, for example, consequences for regional versus local well-being or 
time preferences vary strongly. Risks of nuclear accidents, food shortages from increased land 
competition due to bioenergy production, or the loss of an important industry are assessed in the WGIII 
contribution of the IPCC AR5, but they cannot be summarized in a single number 5,29. One option for 
future research is to more fully evaluate and quantify the risks from mitigation, potentially in a summary 
framework such as “reasons for concern.” This is particularly important for aggressive mitigation 
pathways, with rapid decrease in emissions or large negative emissions, since these pathways may imply 
trade-offs with other policy objectives such as universal access to energy or the preservation of 
biodiversity. As flagged by others 13, exploring the risks linked to a massive use of bioenergy paired with 
carbon capture and sequestration to achieve large negative emissions should be a priority for future 
research.  
The resulting risk–risk comparisons would still be difficult and dependent on values and preferences, 
especially because the reasons for concern linked to climate change risks and those linked to mitigation 
risks will be very different and therefore not directly comparable. Critical differences will include (1) 
limits to our ability to manage risks (i.e. limits to adaptation to climate change impacts but also to side 
effects of mitigation), (2) opportunities for co-benefits linking adaptation and mitigation with 
sustainable development, and (3) the irreversibility created by different risks.  
For example, the figure does not show that mitigation efforts can be adjusted over time as we learn 
their costs and consequences. In contrast, climate change and its impacts involve irreversibility over 
centuries and beyond, placing limits on learning and adjustment (IPCC, 2014a). For decision-makers, this 
asymmetry in irreversibility supports a precautionary approach, with significant short-term mitigation 
efforts that can be relaxed over time if more information rules out the most pessimistic climate change 
and technology scenarios. Such adjustment in mitigation policies could be informed by regular 
assessments, including through revisions of Figure 1, accounting for better information on climate 
system dynamics, impacts on ecosystems and societies, and mitigation technologies, costs, and more 
detailed and regionalized risk categories. International climate agreements therefore have to be 
designed as iterative risk management tools. The challenge is to balance the need for predictability and 
credibility of country commitments with enough flexibility to allow for regular revisions in light of new 
information and feedback from existing climate policies.   
Finally, Figure 1 encompasses risks and climate policies intertwined with development pathways but 
does not make explicit the linkages with development. Depending on which development pathway is 
followed, climate change impacts and climate policies can result in very different risks. Risks will be 
lower in a future world in which local and global governance improves, natural resources are used 
efficiently and managed sustainably, technological change is rapid and directed toward sustainable 
options, and if development is rapid and inclusive 30. Ill-designed mitigation policies could impact 
development pathways in a way that reduces the adaptive capacity of ecosystems (because habitats are 
threatened by bioenergy) or of economies and societies (by slowing poverty alleviation or access to 
universal energy), increasing the overall impacts of climate change. A new set of socioeconomic scenario 
pathways – currently under development – will allow for a better consideration of these issues and be a 
pillar in the literature assessed as part of the 6th assessment cycle of the IPCC 31,32.  
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But over the short term, decision-makers will have the difficult task of bringing together the climate 
agenda with their development goals and strategies, at the domestic and international levels. In 
September 2015, the United Nations General Assembly in New York City adopted the Sustainable 
Development Goals, which will influence development policies over the coming decades. A few months 
later, the 21st Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change in Paris set up the future international architecture to stabilize climate change. Future research 
– and future IPCC assessments – should help decision-makers harmonize these two agendas and make 
the long-term climate goal an integral part of the development agenda.  
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